


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# **SOME ASPECTS**

**OF THE**

# **PHILIPPINE QUESTION**

**BY**

**PROFESSOR DEAN C. WORCESTER**

**OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, AND MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION**

**AN ADDRESS DELIVERED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE  
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HAMILTON CLUB OF CHICAGO.

SERIAL PUBLICATIONS.

NUMBER 13.

## SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION.

BY DEAN C. WORCESTER.

Delivered under the auspices of the Club, November 15, 1899.

It would be presumptuous for any man to attempt a comprehensive discussion of the Philippine question within the limits of a single address, and I shall not undertake anything so ambitious to-night—but I am very glad to have this opportunity to address the Hamilton Club and its friends on certain phases of the great problem which to-day confronts us, and in which the American public takes so keen an interest.

It is not, I think, too much to say that the issues which it raises, directly and indirectly, are more important, more far-reaching in their consequences, than any our nation has been called upon to meet since its birth. In what sort of a spirit, then, are we to face them?

There *are* those who are willing to make mere party politics out of questions which involve the present well-being, no less than the future destiny, of millions of their fellow creatures. Too mean and small to take a broad view of any subject, they are incapable of ascribing to others motives higher than those by which they are themselves actuated. To such as these I have nothing to say, to-night or at any other time. I am glad to believe that they constitute the small minority of our citizens, and that the rest of us are honestly striving to get at the truth. We realize that the Philippine question is in no sense a party question. If ever we were called upon to face a problem of national and international importance it is now, and that problem must be settled on its merits. A settlement on any other basis can result only in national disaster.

Those of us who approach the Philippine question in this spirit may differ honestly, and very widely, as to the ends which are desirable, and the means best calculated to promote their attainment, but we can always find common ground because, each in his own way, we are seeking the same general results.

In our calmer moments, at least, we recognize the fact that there is nothing to gain by calling each other hard names, or casting reflections on each other's motives. In general, we admit that two things are essential to the intelligent and sane discussion of any

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issue. One is a knowledge of the facts involved; the other, the disposition and ability to interpret those facts correctly.

In the present instance these two essentials are not altogether easy of attainment. Our great distance from the Philippine archipelago, and the unreliable character of much that finds its way into our local press concerning conditions there, make facts hard to obtain, while differences of race, training, and temperament between the Filipinos and ourselves make it difficult, if not impossible, for many of us to put ourselves in their place. Those who reason that under given circumstances these children of the tropics would feel as we do, will sooner or later fall into grievous error.

While looking over newspaper comments on the preliminary report submitted to the President of the United States by the Commission of which I have the honor to be a member, I noted with interest a suggestion, evidently made in all sincerity, that if the Commissioners would only *read the newspapers* they would learn much that was new to them about the situation in the Philippines.

Now I must admit that for many months I have been in a country where I could not readily avail myself of that wonderful institution, the great American daily; still I trust that my sojourn in the Philippine Islands has not been altogether without its compensating advantages. I notice that a professor at your great university here is reported to have said that the Commissioners might just as well have written their report before visiting the archipelago. Now, that professor is mistaken. *He* might have done so, but *I*, at least, *really* could not, for I had much to learn, and not a little to unlearn; and not being gifted with second-sight, I was driven to the necessity of gaining a knowledge of conditions in the Philippines by observation, and of ascertaining the feelings and aspirations of the people by daily conversations with them.

Since my return to America, however, I have acted on the suggestion of the editor above mentioned, and have read the newspapers. The result has been, as predicted, that I have learned much that I did not even suspect before, as to the events leading up to the war in which we are at present engaged; much concerning the feelings and aspirations of the Filipinos, which I can safely say would greatly surprise the Filipinos themselves were it to be communicated to them.

If we are compelled to admit the truth of all the accusations brought by those who declaim against our so-called "crime in the Philippines" we have indeed committed a great transgression against the people of those Islands. With your permission I propose to take up some of the alleged facts cited in support of these serious charges and scrutinize them somewhat closely. I shall try to make my examination wholly dispassionate. Nothing is further from my intention or desire than to become involved in any controversy. Should I fall into error, I shall be very glad to be set right, and I assume that the authors of any statements which I may find it necessary to criticise will meet me in the same friendly spirit which I per-

sonally feel toward all who take an honest interest in our great Philippine problem.

The statements which I desire to discuss are so numerous, so disconnected, and in not a few cases so contradictory, that I find some difficulty in putting them into logical order. In general, it would seem that those who deal in them had experienced the same trouble. There has recently been a noteworthy exception, however, in the case of a gentleman who addressed an audience from the rostrum on which I stand, and in taking up my points, it will be convenient for me to roughly follow the order which he adopted, and in some instances to quote his statements of propositions which I examine.

First, then.—It has been persistently stated that either before or soon after his arrival at Manila, Aguinaldo was definitely promised independence for his people by one American official or another, and many who do not make this claim maintain that he was promised it by *implication*, if not in so many words. Consul Pratt and Admiral Dewey have often been named as the guilty men. What are the facts?

There is nothing in the official report to show that Admiral Dewey ever made any such promise, either directly or indirectly, and whatever political tricksters may think, or say, concerning his recent personal statement in regard to the matter, I know I am safe in believing that the *American people* will accept it as final. Aguinaldo ought to know as much about this matter as anyone, so we will let him speak for himself.

On May 24, 1898, in his first proclamation, he says:  
"FILIPINOS:

"The great nation, North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a *protection\** which is decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering us endowed with sufficient civilization to *govern by ourselves* this our unhappy land." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 431.)

It will be seen that the implication here as to the granting of independence is of a very mild description, and there is nothing said of promises.

On June 10th Aguinaldo addressed a letter to President McKinley, called forth by a statement in the London Times, that the United States might sell the Philippine Islands to some European power after taking them from the Spaniards. In this letter he says:

"I close by protesting once and a thousand times, in the name of this people, which knows how to fight for its honor by means of its improvised warriors and artillery men, against the statement published by the Times, mainly for the purpose of casting a blot in history upon its glorious name; *a people which trusts blindly in you not to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain*, and I offer fervent prayers for the ever-increasing prosperity of your powerful nation,

\* All italics are the speaker's.

to which and to you I shall show unbounded gratitude, and shall repay with interest that great obligation."

If anyone had promised Aguinaldo independence it would have been only natural for him to mention the fact in his letter to the President. In his proclamation of June 18th he is much more explicit as to his desires, saying:

"I have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my efforts and strength, *is nothing else but your independence*, for I am firmly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire, and that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining our liberty and entrance into the concert of civilized nations." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 432.)

It will be noted, however, that there is no claim here as to promises made. In a letter dated Bacoar, July 24th, and addressed to General Anderson, he says:

"I came from Hong Kong *to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans*, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not allow any internal discord, because, being a judge of their desires, I had the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires.

"Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domination, I established a Revolutionary Government. \* \* \* It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we *expected* that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, *would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation.*" (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 394.)

Note well that five weeks after proclaiming independence to his people, he makes no claim that it was promised him, but says that he came from Hong Kong *to prevent his people from aiding the Spaniards against us.*

In a letter to Mr. Williams, the United States Consul at Manila, under date of August 1st, Aguinaldo by implication flatly contradicts his original statement in the following words:

"They assert, besides, that *it is possible to suppose* that I was brought from Hong Kong to assure those [i. e., the American] forces by my presence *that the Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards*, and that they had delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, fatigue, blood and treasure that a war with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions." (Sen. Doc. 62, 398.)

On August 6th he calls on foreign governments to recognize "the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Phil-



ippines" (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 438), but he says nothing about promises.

In a proclamation published as a supplement to "The Herald of the Revolution," January 5, 1899, four weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, we notice a radical change in tone, and here, at last, he makes a definite charge in the following words:

"In conclusion, I protest against such an unexpected act which treats of American sovereignty in these Islands in the face of all the antecedents which I have in my possession, referring to my relations with the American authorities, which are unequivocal testimony that the United States did not take me out of Hong Kong to make war against Spain for their own benefit, but for the benefit of our *liberty and independence*; TO WHICH END SAID AUTHORITIES VERBALLY PROMISED ME THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT AND EFFICACIOUS CO-OPERATION."

Why, it may well be asked, was this important statement so long delayed, if true? Why did he not strengthen his position by declaring in his very first proclamation that the Americans had promised their support and co-operation in the attempt to win independence?

Thus far I have confined myself strictly to the official record. I wish now to add that members of Aguinaldo's own cabinet testified before the Commission to the fact that even after his proclamation of June 18th, *he freely admitted that no American had ever promised him independence.*

In view of this admission, it is perhaps unnecessary to pursue the question further; nevertheless, I shall do so. It has been often stated that our Consul at Singapore, Mr. Spencer Pratt, exceeded his authority and made the promise in question, if not directly, at least indirectly. I am indebted to Admiral Dewey for the statement that Mr. Pratt is ready to take oath to never having made any such promise. The following is his official statement in regard to the matter:

"I beg to repeat \* \* that I declined even to discuss with Gen. Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would co-operate with him (General Aguinaldo) for the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 358.)

I may add that legal proceedings, brought by Mr. Pratt against John Foreman, for publishing this and other charges in his book on the Philippine Islands, resulted successfully, Mr. Foreman being compelled to remove the offending page and insert an apology. It is only fair to suppose that had there been any proof of this statement he would have brought it forward.

Now a word as to implied promises in general. It has been said that our officials throughout the far East, by failing to immediately inform Aguinaldo and his supporters that independence would not be granted to them by the United States, as soon as they mentioned their aspirations for it, and by seeking their aid in our war against

Spain, promised them by *implication* that their desires would be granted, and it has been further maintained that they were left in this delusion until after the fall of Manila, when we no longer had need of their services.

It is, I believe, admitted, that the question of whether or not independence shall be granted to the Filipinos rests with the Congress of the United States. How anyone could possibly have answered it before the conclusion of the treaty of peace at Paris determined whether or not we had any status in the matter, does not appear; much less is it evident how this could have been done before the fall of Manila, or even before an American soldier had set foot on Luzon. It is hardly to be wondered at, therefore, that our officials in the far East did not avail themselves of the first opportunity to attempt to settle finally a question which lay entirely beyond their jurisdiction!

But is it true that we let our unsuspecting allies go on without a hint as to the uncertainty of their position?

On July 17th, Major Jones, acting under authority of General Anderson, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:

"Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to *expel the Spaniards, and to give a good government to the whole people*, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 391.)

"To *give a good government to the whole people!*" Is there any implied promise of independence here?

On July 22nd General Anderson wrote further, as follows:

"I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign power. \* \* \* I cannot, without orders, recognize your civil authority." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 394.)

Finally, on August 24th, General Merritt wrote:

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is concerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as the military representative only of the United States, to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of Americans out here, and the Government of which you already know the beneficence, *to determine these matters in the future.*" (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 402.)

In view of the facts above cited, what must we think as to the accuracy, not to say the disingenuousness, of the following statement?

"It was weeks after various proclamations and other public utterances of Aguinaldo to that effect, that the correspondence between him and General Anderson that I have quoted, took place, and that *the useful services of the Filipinos as our practical allies* were accepted. It is further an undisputed fact that during this period our

Government did not inform the Filipinos that their fond expectations as to our recognition of their independence were mistaken. Our Secretary of State did, indeed, on June 16th, write to Mr. Pratt, our Consul-General at Singapore, that our Government knew the insurgents \* \* \* merely as 'discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain,' who if we occupied their country in consequence of war would have to yield us due 'obedience,' and other officers of our government were instructed not to make any promises to the Filipinos as to the future, but the Filipinos themselves were not so informed. THEY WERE LEFT TO BELIEVE THAT WHILE FIGHTING IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE AMERICAN FORCES, THEY WERE FIGHTING FOR THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE."

It is at least not too much to say that in quoting the correspondence between General Anderson and Aguinaldo, the author of this statement overlooked several important passages.

Let us take up another contention which has been persistently reiterated; namely, that when our forces arrived at Manila, the Filipinos were struggling to throw off the yoke of Spain. It is urged that "the Filipinos, constituting the strongest and foremost tribe of the population of the archipelago, *had long been fighting for freedom and independence.*"

The Tagalogs are of course referred to. Now the Visayans are the equals, if not the superiors, of the Tagalogs, in advancement, and exceed them in numbers as well as in extent of territory occupied, while in the matter of strength, none of the numerous Philippine peoples have been able in the past to hold their own unaided against the Moros, and I doubt if any one of them could do it to-day. These questions aside, however, were the Tagalogs really fighting the Spaniards when Admiral Dewey arrived in Manila Bay, and if so, for what, and with what chance of success? To answer this question we must go back a little. From 1872 to 1896 peace reigned in the Philippine Archipelago. In the latter year a bloody revolution broke out, but it is a matter of simple history that this movement had for its object the attainment of certain definite and specific reforms, the nature of which was clearly and publicly set forth by the revolutionary leaders, who had no thought or expectation of shaking off the sovereignty of Spain.

This revolution was brought to an end on December 14th, 1897, by the famous treaty of Biac-na-bató, the Spanish Governor-General, Primo de Rivera, having promised certain of the reforms sought, and having further undertaken to place at the disposal of one Pedro Paterno, who served as a go-between, a large sum of money to be distributed among the prominent insurgent officials, on condition that they would surrender the arms of their troops, and would themselves leave the country. Of this transaction it has been said:

"The old slander that Aguinaldo had sold out the revolutionary movement for a bribe of \$400,000 has been so thoroughly exploded by the best authorities, that it requires uncommon audacity to repeat it," and the doubter is referred for corroboration of this statement to Senate Document 62, page 421.

To Senate Document 62, let us accordingly go. On page 421 I find the following:

"In August, 1896, an insurrection broke out in Cavite and soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued \* \* until December, 1897, when the Governor-General, Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the substance of the document which is in possession of Señor Felipe Agoncillo \* \* \* \* being attached hereto. In brief, *it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to pay them \$800,000 in silver* and promising to introduce numerous reforms. \* \* \* Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hong Kong and Singapore. A portion of the money, \$400,000 (Mexican), was deposited in banks at Hong Kong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs, named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho \$5,000 (Mexican)."

It cannot be denied that the position taken by Aguinaldo as to the use of this fund was honorable if he was sincere in it, but even among his own countrymen there have been those who doubted his sincerity, saying that, having deposited the entire sum in his own name, he resisted a division of it because he desired to use it for his private ends. As a matter of fact it was used, in part at least, to further the new revolutionary movement; but it should not be forgotten that this movement promptly resulted in a dictatorship for Aguinaldo himself. Finally, it is not altogether evident that a man's announcing his *intention* of putting certain cash to honest uses "*explodes*" the theory that he was bought with it.

Now it happens that Senate Document 62 is not the only source of information on this subject. Numerous witnesses, conversant with the facts, testified before the Commission, and some new information was obtained. We inquired what became of the \$400,000 (Mexican) which was *not* paid to Aguinaldo and his followers. It seems that Primo de Rivera claims this amount was given to Pedro Paterno with which to "*pacify*" the leaders who remained in Luzon. Paterno insists that it was duly distributed, while the leaders in question maintain that they never received a penny of it; and as one of our Filipino witnesses remarked, "It has never been definitely ascertained who forgot that he had this sum in his pocket."

Highly interesting, also, in this connection, is a letter from Paterno himself, under date of February 23, 1898. This letter was addressed to a well-known Spanish official, and was read in a public session of Congress at Madrid on June 16th, of the same year. It begins:

"My Esteemed Friend: As it appears that at last one is thinking

of giving me something for the services rendered by me, and as, according to you, the recompense is going to be a title of Castile, I wish to speak frankly in secret on the subject."

Speaking further of his desires, he says:

"In the fourth place it must be valued in dollars, so that the reward may not be held in contempt by the public, who know my liberality when I pay with splendid generosity sea voyages, river and land journeys, for myself and for my emissaries; or when I distribute with abundant profusion pecuniary and material recompenses TO BUY OVER THE WILLS OF, AND UNITE ALL THE INSURGENT CHIEFS TO BRING THEM TO SURRENDER TO SPAIN. \* \* \* To conclude, I want a title of Castile, that of Prince or Duke, if possible, and to be a Grandee of the first class, free of nobility patent fees, and the sum of \$. . . . . once for all."

Paterno's innate modesty evidently prevents him from naming the exact sum in the *body* of the letter, but under the letters "N. B." at the end of it, he adds:

"Verbally, I mentioned *one million of dollars*, and that Parliament should meet sometimes for the Philippines, and for extraordinary reasons. Take note that out of the 25,000 men sent here by Spain on account of the insurrection, statistics show 6,000 struck off the effective list in the first six months, and many millions of dollars expenses. THE LITTLE PRESENT, OR THE CHRISTMAS BOX, MY AGUINALDO, IS OF NO MEAN WORTH."

Evidently Paterno thought he had bought someone. Paterno ought to know.

Now as to the co-operation alleged to have taken place between the Filipino forces and our own. It is not to be denied that General Anderson asked for such co-operation and that Aguinaldo promised it, but it will be readily admitted that it is one thing to ask and another to receive; one thing to promise and another to fulfill one's promises. Did Aguinaldo live up to his agreement? There are those who unhesitatingly reply to this question in the affirmative, saying that, "his force did faithfully and effectively co-operate with ours," that he responded cordially to General Anderson's invitation and "an extended correspondence followed, special services being asked for by the party of the first part, being rendered by the party of the second part, and duly acknowledged by the first." *All of this went on pleasantly until the capture of Manila*, "in which Aguinaldo's forces effectively co-operated." This is important if true, but *is it true?* Let us examine this correspondence and see. It is found in Senate Document No. 62, and a comparison of the letters with Mr. Schurz'—shall we say *condensation* of them, illustrates admirably the way in which that valuable document is frequently used:

"July 6, 1898.

"Señor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy,

"Commanding Philippine Forces.

"General:—I am encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant,

U. S. N.

to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both.

"Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer, that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 391.)

Apparently, however, there was some difficulty about co-operation, when it became necessary for Aguinaldo to *do* anything, for under date of July 17th, we read:

"General Emilio Aguinaldo,

"Sir:—Gen. Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Parañaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter it, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price but no more. WE FIND SO FAR THAT THE NATIVE POPULATION ARE NOT WILLING TO GIVE US THIS ASSISTANCE AS PROMPTLY AS REQUIRED. But we must have it, and, if it becomes necessary, we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 391.)

"At 3:30 p. m., July 17th, General Aguinaldo and secretary called to say that two Americans, *assuming* to be officers, had called and presented a letter as to which he requested a statement *whether it was authorized*." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 392.)

General Anderson endorsed the letter as follows:

"The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was made by my direction." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 392.)

It will be observed that things were fairly bristling with "smoothness" at this time. On the following day Aguinaldo replied to General Anderson, promising to furnish the assistance wanted. Nevertheless, on July 23d we find the following from General Anderson to him:

"General:—When I came here *three weeks ago* I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American army, as it was to fight in the cause of your people. *So far we have received no response*.

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts.

"If you cannot secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people.

"*I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience*." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 394.)

This peremptory communication had the desired effect. Aguinaldo replied with excuses and regrets, and furnished a part of the assistance asked for. In a letter written July 24th, acknowledging

Yours

the receipt of his communication, General Anderson adds the following significant statement:

"The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of caramates, etc., *told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part.*" (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 396.)

As to the relations between Aguinaldo and General Anderson at this time, we further find the following over the name of General F. V. Greene:

"The only general officer who saw him [Aguinaldo] or had any communication with him was General Anderson. *He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far in a letter of July 23d as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent,* a notice which it is hardly necessary to say was ignored." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 423.)

Now every one of these statements appears in Senate Document Number 62, but they seem to have been overlooked by the gentleman who said, "all of this went on pleasantly until the capture of Manila." This is not all. Witnesses testified before the Commission that Aguinaldo *positively forbade* his people to assist General Anderson, and that on the occasion of the landing of our forces at Parañaque he seriously considered the advisability of attacking them. This idea he eventually gave up, thinking it would be better to enter Manila with our troops, and procure, if possible, the arms and ammunition surrendered by the Spanish soldiers. It has further been said:

"Whether there was or not any form of compact or alliance signed and sealed, no candid man who has studied the official documents will deny that in point of fact the Filipinos having been desired and invited to do so, *were, before the capture of Manila, acting and were PRACTICALLY RECOGNIZED as our allies, and that as such they did effective service which we accepted and profited by.* This is an indisputable fact, proved by the record."

Let us therefore again go to the record. In his letter of August 1st, to Consul Williams, Aguinaldo said:

"*Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals, and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive?*" \* \* It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present, the American forces have not shown an active, only a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the intention of these forces is not for the best." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 398.)

As to co-operation in the attack on Manila, General Greene makes the following statement:

"The day before the attack on Manila he [Aguinaldo] sent staff officers to the same general, asking for our plans of attack, so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his brigade commanders, to which I replied that *I was not authorized to give the information desired.*" (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 423.)

It would therefore appear that we were not accepting the "services" offered at this time.

On the 13th of August Aguinaldo addressed the following communication to General Anderson:

"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made of money and lives, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT PRUDENT TO ISSUE ORDERS TO THE CONTRARY, AS THEY MIGHT BE DISOBEYED AGAINST MY AUTHORITY. \* \* Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding *and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards*, I will commission Don Filipé Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and [trust?] that they will be safe during the conference." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 399.)

Not only does this communication badly shake the "co-operation" theory, but we see that on the very day the city fell Aguinaldo admitted that he doubted his ability to control his own troops, and indulged in a not very deeply veiled threat to attack us if we did not allow his undisciplined followers to enter Manila.

Finally, I have Aguinaldo's own statement to submit as to this whole matter. It occurs in a proclamation issued by him at Malolos, January 5, 1899:

"The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Parañaque and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops, as far as Maytubig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my own people *by the employment of astuteness not unaccompanied by violence*. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, *although I was not notified*."

Now, what part *did* the insurgents take? Some interesting facts were testified to before the Commission. It is believed that our troops were wounded and killed by fire from the insurgents during the attack, and an officer was sent to warn the latter that they were firing into our men. After the flag of truce had been displayed on the battlements of the city, an insurgent force fired on Spanish soldiers who were standing exposed on the walls, provoking a return fire which killed one of our men and wounded three. It cannot be denied that the insurgents had been promised the loot of Manila. They attempted to enter the city and refused to retire when ordered to do so. It became necessary to drive them back practically at the bayonet point. So general was the idea that Manila would be looted that men, women and children streamed toward the city all day on August 13th, coming from the neighboring towns, with sacks which they expected to fill with plunder.

Remembering that Aguinaldo himself doubted his ability to restrain his troops before we entered Manila, and was apparently



unable to do so, how would it have been if they had once got inside? As a matter of fact, they constituted a menace rather than a help, and, as the official record states: "The world knows that the attack [on Manila] was only delayed to protect the city and its Spanish inhabitants from the dreaded vengeance of the insurgents." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 151.)

Manila lay completely at the mercy of Dewey's guns. The fighting of August 13th was perfunctory, and designed only to save the honor of the Spanish troops. Land forces were needed only for garrison duty.

After the fall of the city Aguinaldo modestly demanded the Royal Palace for himself, and in addition the principal churches, a share in the public funds, and, most important of all, the arms and ammunition surrendered by the Spanish troops, of which he had long planned to possess himself. It is needless to add that his requests were refused.

I believe I have said enough to show that there was no true co-operation between our land forces and the Filipinos. We fought a common foe, each in his own way, and that was all.

After the fall of Manila the feeling between Americans and insurgents grew rapidly worse. The latter were at first allowed to occupy some of the suburbs of the city, but they committed intolerable abuses, and the police, being outnumbered, were unable to restrain them. It therefore became necessary to order them back, and this angered them still more. Meanwhile, the anti-American feeling was steadily, although secretly, nourished by the insurgent leaders. So-called "popular clubs" were organized among the natives with the sole object of stirring up ill-feeling between the opposing forces. From their membership was recruited, later, a numerous local militia, which was to attack us from within when the regular insurgent troops attacked from without. The Filipino Congress passed a decree imposing military service on every male citizen over eighteen years of age. Aguinaldo pigeon-holed a message which was sanctioned by Congress and his Cabinet, requesting the President of the United States not to abandon the Philippine Islands, but to establish a protectorate over them. He further attempted to get the war-making power transferred from Congress to himself, and urged a heavy bond issue to secure a million dollars for the purchase of arms and ammunition.

At last came the day when he ordered his friends to leave Manila. The feeling was general that an attack would soon follow. Meanwhile our soldiers were subjected to constant insults, and persistent attempts were made to provoke them to fire. The patience which they displayed under these trying circumstances was misunderstood. The Filipinos believed it to be due to cowardice and boasted openly that when they attacked they would drive us into the sea within three hours. As I shall show later, there is reason to believe that Aguinaldo at this time received a cable message from his agents at Washington, urging him to attack at once. At all events the signals for an attack were agreed upon.

On the night of February 4th, at 8:45, occurred the incident which gave the insurgents the excuse for which they had been waiting. An insurgent officer attempted to pass our guard at the San Juan Bridge with a detail of men. He was driven back. A little later a large body of insurgent troops made an advance on the South Dakota outposts, which fell back rather than fire. At about the same time an insurgent lieutenant with a detail of six men again attempted to cross the San Juan bridge, where Private Grayson of Company "D", First Nebraska Volunteers, was on guard. After warning them three times to halt without effect, he fired, killing the lieutenant, whose men returned the fire and retreated. Signal rockets were promptly sent up by the Filipinos, and they soon opened a vigorous general attack on our lines, which, as all the world knows, was splendidly repulsed.

Now I ask you to compare this simple statement of well ascertained facts with the following account:

"One evening, early in February last, *some Filipino soldiers entered the American lines without, however, attacking anybody.* An American sentry fired, killing one of the Filipinos. *Then a desultory firing began at the outposts.* It spread until it assumed the proportions of an extensive engagement, in which a large number of Filipinos were killed. It is a well-established fact that this engagement could not have been a premeditated affair on the part of the Filipinos, as many of their officers, including Aguinaldo's private secretary, were at the time at the theaters and cafés of Manila."

As Aguinaldo had some ten thousand armed men inside Manila, it would seem by no means certain that many of his officers would not have remained there, even had they definitely planned an attack for the night of February 4th, but I do not raise this question. What I do say is, that the killing of a native soldier by one of our men in the discharge of his duty afforded no excuse for a general conflict. It is idle to argue that the soldier was the aggressor. The aggressors were the men who attempted to force the line he had been ordered to hold. Only a sense of duty could have prompted his action. One man seldom fires on seven, at short range, for the amusement of the thing.

This was not the first time that a sentry had killed Filipinos, and the incident would not have led to the result which followed had the insurgents not been ready and anxious to attack.

The account of the outbreak of hostilities, given by the Commission, has been criticised on the ground that it does not agree in all details with the account of General MacArthur. I have to say in reply that if any one will take the pains to compare the official accounts of General MacArthur, General Otis, and Admiral Dewey, he will find that no one of them agrees in all of its details with either of the others. This does not, however, prove that all of these gentlemen are liars. The account given by the Commission was based on information obtained from eye witnesses, and I have no apology to make for it. For purposes of comparison, however, I quote General Otis' account:

"MANILA, February 5, 1899.

*"Insurgents in large force opened attack on our outer line at 8:45 last evening. Renewed attack several times during the night. At 4 o'clock this morning entire line engaged. All attacks repulsed. At daybreak advanced against insurgents, and had driven them beyond the line they had formerly occupied."*

It has been stated further that General Otis himself did not believe the insurgent commanders meditated an attack at this time. This is true, for under date of February 7th he cabled as follows:

"Positive insurgent attack not ordered by insurgent government, which has shown inability to control army concentrated around Manila."

This despatch is persistently quoted by a certain section of our press, but for some mysterious reason there seems to be no inclination in that quarter to quote General Otis' later message, under date of February 12th, which I submit for your consideration:

"Reported that insurgent representative at Washington telegraphed Aguinaldo to drive out Americans before arrival of reinforcements. The despatch received Hong Kong, and mailed to Malolos, which decided on attack to be made about 7th instant. *Eagerness of the insurgent troops to engage precipitated battle.*"

This matter aside, the Commission is in possession of abundant proof that the insurgent leaders had planned a general attack to be made at a date not definitely fixed, but in the near future. Signals by means of colored rockets had been agreed upon. Various Filipinos informed us that these signals were promptly shown after the firing began on the night of February 4th, and Admiral Dewey himself saw them from the bay.

I am often asked the question, might not all this have been avoided, even after the fall of Manila, if attempts had been made to reach an understanding with the insurgents. I am glad to be able to say to you that such attempts were made.

General Otis, who did not believe that the insurgent leaders were really plotting trouble, had repeated friendly interviews with one and another of them. Aguinaldo was invited to come to Manila and visit him, and was promised that General Otis would return the visit at Malolos, but he declined the invitation. On January 9th General Otis addressed a long communication to him, in the hope that this, together with a formal conference of Commissioners for which he had provided, would bring about an understanding. In this communication he says:

"Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Philippine people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our Commissioners, by thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to think that we meditate an attack, WHILE I AM UNDER THE STRICTEST ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES TO AVOID A CONFLICT IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. My troops, witnessing the earnestness and the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops, and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Philippine people depend upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. *This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States, and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy.* That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States, expressed through its representatives in Congress. *For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people, and shall continue to labor with that end in view.* THERE SHALL BE NO CONFLICT OF FORCES IF I AM ABLE TO AVOID IT, AND STILL I SHALL ENDEAVOR TO MAINTAIN A POSITION TO MEET ALL EMERGENCIES."

General Otis named three able officers as a Commission, specifying that they were "to meet a Committee appointed by General Aguinaldo, to confer with regard to the situation of affairs, and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims and desires of the Philippine people and the people of the United States." Six sessions were held, the last occurring on the 29th of January, only six days before the outbreak of hostilities. Our purposes and intentions were fully explained to the Filipino Commissioners, and, after all attempts to arrive at an understanding had proved fruitless, they were handed a communication from General Otis closing with the words: "I AM OBLIGED TO HOLD MANILA AND ITS DEFENSES, BUT NO HOSTILE ACT WILL BE INAUGURATED BY THE UNITED STATES TROOPS." The prime cause of the failure of these final negotiations lay in the fact that the Filipino Commissioners were unable to formulate any definite statement of their own desires. They did say that they desired independence under United States protection, but, in discussion, made it evident, first: that they did not themselves know what they meant by these words; and second, that they were not agreed among themselves even on the general proposition.

It is charged that we did not conquer the Philippines, but bought sovereignty over them from Spain, and that sovereignty has been likened to "a soup made by boiling the shadow of the breast-bone of a pigeon that had been starved to death." The objector continues: "Now look at the circumstances under which that session was made. *Spain had lost the country except a few isolated and helpless little garrisons, most of which were effectively blockaded by the Filipinos.* The American forces occupied Cavite and the harbor and city of Manila, and nothing more. The bulk of the country

was occupied and possessed by the people thereof, *over whom Spain had, in point of fact, ceased to exercise any authority, the Spanish power having been driven out or destroyed by the Filipino insurrection.*"

The figure of speech is certainly very pretty, and the statements which follow it are very plausible, but suppose we examine the facts. Had the Filipinos really accomplished all this at the time indicated? Did they ever at any subsequent time accomplish it? On August 30th General F. V. Greene gives the following account of the existing state of affairs:

"It is a fact that the Visayas have taken no active part in the present insurrection, nor in that of 1896; *that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo and in the Visayas' Islands*, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The Visayas number nearly two million, or about as many as the population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on account of racial prejudices and jealousies, and other causes, they will oppose him." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 425.)

It would appear, then, that at this time the Filipino insurrection had by no means "driven out or destroyed the Spanish power." Now, as a matter of fact, what had it done? General Greene states, under the same date as above:

"Such a force can hardly be called an army, and yet the service which it has rendered should not be underestimated. Between two thousand and three thousand Spanish native troops surrendered to it during the months of June and July; it constantly annoyed and harassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night, and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants, as well as the Spanish troops, were forced to live on horse and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It captured the waterworks of Manila, and cut off the water supply, and if it had been in the dry season, would have inflicted great suffering on the inhabitants for lack of water." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 420.)

What did Aguinaldo himself claim for his forces? We will let him answer. In his proclamation to foreign governments, issued August 6th, he made the following statement:

"The said revolution now rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Union, Infanta and Zambales, and it holds besieged the capital of Manila." (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 438.)

In other words, he claimed to control the Tagalog provinces and practically nothing more.

Several weeks after the capitulation of Manila he sent a number of small vessels to the Island of Panay carrying Tagalog soldiers, who landed in the province of Antique. The Spanish troops met and promptly defeated them. Other forces were sent, however, and

by the middle of November they controlled practically the whole island except Iloilo and its immediate vicinity.

On the 5th of September the Spanish Government applied to Washington, through the French Ambassador, for permission to reinforce its garrisons in the Central and Southern Islands, but this permission was not granted.

On October 31st the American Peace Commissioners demanded the cession of the Philippines, and on November 28th Spain acceded to this demand. During the first week of December the Madrid Government ordered General Rios to suspend hostilities in the Visayan Islands and retire with his troops to Mindanao, pending arrangements for their return to Spain. This order was issued because of the evident uselessness of shedding Spanish blood in the defense of territory which was soon to pass from the hands of Spain forever. Before Rios could leave Iloilo the insurgents attacked him. He promptly administered a severe defeat to them, and then evacuated the town, the insurgents at once taking possession. On the 23d of December Spanish control came to an end in the Visayan Islands, although it continued long afterward in Mindanao and the islands of the Sulu archipelago. The Visayans themselves were in utter discord. They broke up into rival factions, each of which wished to set up a government of its own. It should be clearly borne in mind, then, that the Spaniards retired from the Visayan Islands *on account of the action of the United States Commissioners at Paris*, and not because compelled to do so by natives of the Tagalog or any other tribe.

Now let us look a little further. On the 1st of May, 1898, Admiral Dewey sent the flower of the Spanish fleet in Philippine waters to the bottom. There still remained fourteen gunboats in the archipelago. One of these entered Manila Bay and was captured. The others prudently kept away. Had the Spanish fleet been cruising through the waters of the group at will, would Aguinaldo and his followers have attempted to return to the islands? Had they succeeded in doing so could they have raised an army within a few miles of Manila without molestation? Had they raised such an army where would they have obtained rifles and ammunition for it? Would they have had such an easy time with the garrisons in the interior had the soldiers held in Manila by the presence of our blockading fleet been free to go to their rescue? Could they have successfully invested the city by land had we not cut off all aid by sea? If so, why did they not do it in the rebellion of 1896? Does any sane man believe that with the Spanish fleet afloat they could have despatched armed expeditions to attack the Spanish garrison and the peaceable natives in other islands? Can it be believed that Spain would have failed to reinforce her Philippine garrison had she been allowed to do so? *And who stood in the way?*

In view of the facts cited I have no hesitation in saying that the United States did infinitely more than Aguinaldo's army toward driving out and destroying Spanish power in the Philippine Islands. If our claim to sovereignty was shadowy, what shall we say as to

the claim of a tribe representing less than one-sixth of the population of the archipelago and exercising jurisdiction over but a small part of the total territory? When Spain ceded to us her sovereignty in the Philippines she had already lost *through us*, directly or indirectly, practically all that she no longer possessed herself.

It is said that the so-called peace treaty was no peace treaty at all, but was "an open and brutal declaration of war against our allies, the Filipinos, who struggled for freedom and independence from foreign rule." It is said, further, that this treaty was made behind doors "which were tightly closed to the people of the Philippines." Neither statement is true. The doors at Paris were not closed to the people of the Philippines, and at least one well-known Filipino appeared before the American Commissioners and strongly urged them to insist on the cession of the islands. Leading Filipinos at Malolos eventually became alarmed lest the United States should abandon them, and it was decided that a message should be sent to President McKinley asking him "what desires he had about the country, and what form of government he wished to establish," at the same time urging him not to abandon the Filipinos, but to establish a protectorate over them. Definite action was secured, authorizing the sending of such a message but Aguinaldo personally prevented it.

The Filipinos were united in their desire that we should expel Spain and the majority of them were anxious that we should not even then abandon them. It is difficult to see how under these circumstances a treaty which provided for cession of sovereignty to the United States, and left the future relationship between the Filipinos and the American Government to be determined constituted "a declaration of war."

The President's order of December 21st, providing for the extension of military rule throughout the archipelago, has been similarly characterized. The critics are not wholly consistent; they first blame the Government for not informing the Filipinos that they will not be granted immediate independence; then, when such an announcement is made, they call it a brutal declaration of war.

Let us examine for a moment the circumstances under which this order was issued. Spain's withdrawal of her troops from the Visayan Islands placed us in a most embarrassing position. Chaos followed the event. The Tagalogs in Panay were sufficiently numerous to dominate the Visayans who populate that island, yet they set up a new "republic" with a president of its own. The foreign residents of Iloilo, the principal city of the island, asked for American troops. The people of Negros wisely kept out Tagalog adventurers, and established a government of their own, almost immediately sending word that they wished to accept American sovereignty. Cebu was less fortunate. Tagalogs landed there in considerable numbers, and after enlisting the services of the lawless element in the island, attempted to compel the peaceable natives to join them, killing many of those who refused. A small Tagalog force entered the islands of Samar and Leyte, oppressing and mal-

treating their Visayan inhabitants. It must have been evident to anyone in the least familiar with conditions in the Philippines that such results would inevitably follow the withdrawal of the Spanish troops. The only possible way of preventing bloody disorder, ending eventually in utter anarchy, was to extend our military government to the ceded territory. Yet because the President issued an order providing for this step he is accused of having declared war against the Filipinos. Many of the peaceable Visayans certainly did not look upon the matter in this light. On the contrary, I have repeatedly heard our administration bitterly criticised by leading men from the Central Islands because this order was not put into immediate effect. Could this have been done it would have saved great loss of property, and, what is far more important, untold suffering. To have unnecessarily delayed action, under the circumstances, would have been little short of criminal, and my only regret is that circumstances prevented the immediate execution of a plan which was demanded by the existing conditions and would have been beneficent in its results.

Much has been said and written in praise of Aguinaldo's government. As a matter of fact, what sort of a government did he set up? Its general features are well known. At its head was a self-established dictator. He was aided by a congress composed of members nominally elected, but really, with few exceptions, named by himself. The vice-president of this congress informed me that it was composed exclusively of Tagalogs and that Aguinaldo could, and did, remove those who displeased him. It included among its members many men of marked ability, who had accepted office in the hope of bringing about conservative action, and with the promise that nothing should be done to antagonize the Americans. They promptly resigned when they saw that the task they had undertaken was a hopeless one. Aguinaldo's first cabinet included several very able Filipinos, who had joined it under similar conditions and who left it for the same cause.

Whatever may be said of its ability, the Malolos congress was never, in any sense of the word, representative of anything but the Tagalog tribe. Its strongest members deserted Aguinaldo and came over to us when he decided on war.

The Central government aside, what did the Tagalogs accomplish in an administrative way, in their own provinces, and what in those they succeeded in dominating? In this connection it has been said:

"The ghastliest argument of all in the defense of the President's course is that he had to extend American sovereignty over the whole archipelago, even before the ratification of the treaty, and that he was, *and is now*, obliged to shoot down the Filipinos to the end of restoring order and preventing anarchy on the islands."

The author of the above statement adds:

"I challenge the Imperialists to show me any instance of bloody disturbances or other savagery among themselves sufficient to cre-



ate any necessity of our armed interference to restore order, or to save them from anarchy."

Now, while I do not desire to lay claim to the title "Imperialist," I will accept that challenge.

At the time I left Manila, the province of Batangas was overrun with thieves and murderers. No attempt was being made to enforce law and order. The public schools were abandoned. Forced contributions had been wrung from the people at the bayonet point until many of them were ruined. Unwilling contributors had been punished by having their hands hacked off, and even by being buried alive. The individual houses in such important towns as Taal were intrenched in order that the inhabitants might defend themselves against their very neighbors. The military governor of the province, although a Tagalog and an insurgent, had characterized the condition existing as "complete anarchy," and had repeatedly sent in secret to Manila asking for aid to restore order, and promising to surrender with his troops if we would only dispatch a small force and make a show of attacking him.

It cannot be claimed that conditions in Batangas were due to outside interference. Except for a couple of prisoners no American soldier had ever set foot there and the people had enjoyed a full measure of "independence" for more than a year. In Cavite province, just south of Manila, the insurgent troops had robbed the inhabitants of the principal towns, and had committed very numerous assaults on women. One of their generals had established a regular seraglio and had flatly refused to obey the orders of his superior officer. The natives of the province were calling the insurgent troops by the name commonly applied to the mythical being popularly supposed to breed the cholera. Men were constantly coming in from the important towns begging us to advance our lines, drive out the insurgents, and give them protection.

I have chosen these two provinces because I personally received almost daily reports of conditions there and know whereof I speak. They were by no means exceptional.

In southern Luzon the Bicolos had risen against the Tagalogs at several points and were asking us for help. The Tagalog general, Lucban, had extorted some \$200,000 from the inhabitants of Samar and Leyte and had put it in his pocket. The people of Bohol were calling for aid. The Moros and the insurgents had fallen to fighting each other in Mindanao where we had not landed a man. Tomas Aguinaldo, an insurgent official, and a cousin of the dictator, had gone to Manburao on the west coast of Mindoro and had there organized a genuine piratical expedition with the avowed object of plundering the peaceable inhabitants of the Calamianes Islands, Palawan, Masbate, Sibuyan and Romblon. This plan had been carried out and he had returned to Manburao heavily laden with plunder, thereby so disgusting Angel Fabié, the insurgent captain of the port at that place, that he had voluntarily come to Manila, given himself up, and begun to work heartily for the American cause. From all sides came accounts of the intolerable abuses prac-

ticed by the insurgent troops, and by bands of robbers made up of deserting soldiers, who had escaped with their arms, and who promptly began to rob and kill their own people. I could go on indefinitely with illustrations but I believe that those given will suffice. The simple fact of the case is that the insurgent government had signally failed to maintain law and order, punish crime, provide for public education or perform any of the essential functions of good government, if we except *the collection of taxes*, in which it had displayed an ability unequalled even under the Spanish régime.

Now a few words as to the feeling of the people toward Americans. Mr. Schurz tells us that "we have managed to turn virtually the whole population, who at first greeted us with childlike trust, as their beloved deliverers, into deadly enemies, for it is a notorious fact that those whom we regard as 'amigos' to-day will to-morrow stand in the ranks of our foes. *We have not a true friend left among the Islanders, unless it is some speculators* and the Sultan of Sulu," and that "it is useless to say that the subjugated Philippine Islanders will become our friends if we give them good government. However good that government may be, it will to them be foreign rule, and foreign rule especially hateful when begun by broken faith, cemented by streams of innocent blood, and erected upon the ruins of devastated homes. The American is, and will remain to them, more a foreigner, an unsympathetic foreigner, than the Spaniard ever was."

If these statements are true, then I know absolutely nothing of the conditions which exist in the Philippine Islands. I denounce them as utterly false. We have many a good and true friend to-day among the leading Filipinos of Manila. Even in the provinces which have been laid waste by war the better element, which has all along been secretly in sympathy with us, is coming out and declaring openly for us. The people in our newly organized towns never wearied of talking to me about the wonderful difference between the Spaniards and the Americans. We are more popular in the great island of Negros to-day than the Spaniards ever were, and we have done in the Sulu Islands what the Spaniards failed to do in more than three centuries. Wherever our troops have remained for a time in contact with the natives, public sentiment has gradually but steadily changed. When we first marched through the province of Bulacan the inhabitants burned their houses and fled before our advancing columns. To-day those same natives have rebuilt their homes, have planted their fields, and are living quietly and contentedly under the protection of our troops, in the enjoyment of a larger measure of local self-government than they ever had before.

Be it remembered that we have accomplished all this in the face of almost insurmountable obstacles. The Spanish authorities, both civil and religious, poisoned the minds of the natives with venomous tales concerning us before our arrival. The Spanish prisoners of war worked against us with might and main as long as they remained in the country. The insurgent press has never ceased to publish

incredible lies about us. We have been hampered by the difference in language, and finally, we have been compelled to fight with one hand and organize and protect with the other.

When I look back over the past nine months, I wonder that we have made so much progress in gaining the good will of the people. How have we done it? By treating our prisoners most humanely; by tenderly caring for the insurgent wounded; by granting protection to the wives and children of those who were fighting against us; by dealing out even-handed justice to those who were wronged. The Filipinos never saw the like before, and it has touched their hearts. In a hundred ways they show that they have begun to trust us. I say to you that if we give them good government the day will soon come when they will fight to the death for us. Nay, more, I say to you that native volunteers are fighting to the death for us to-day against their Tagalog foes.

But, the objectors say, if only a small fraction of the Philippine population is in arms against us, and if the large majority of the people are ready to accept American sovereignty, why is it that we are compelled to send a great army to the islands? I answer first, because we are waging the most humane war in history. If it were simply a matter of killing, we should not need so large an army. Two regiments of troops could go where they choose in the island of Luzon to-day and kill to their heart's content without serious risk. It is because we are attempting to protect the peaceable inhabitants from the depredations of the lawless that we require so large a force. With the evil element once in the ascendant among ten millions of people, the task of restoring order and affording protection to the law-abiding and the peaceable is far from small. There are whole provinces, yes, whole islands, ready to declare for us, as soon as we can send troops to defend their inhabitants against the Tagalogs and against their own lawless citizens.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the persistent activity of those Americans who have favored the insurgent cause has given hope to our enemies and caused alarm to our Filipino friends, who know full well that were our troops to be withdrawn their tenure of life would be more than uncertain. The mere fact that a heavy force is being sent to the Philippines will give courage to those who are friendly to us and will show our enemies that we mean business. It will go far toward ending the war.

Finally, a word as to the way out. Is it conceivable that we should withdraw our troops, abandoning our friends to the certain vengeance of our enemy and the people at large to civil war and utter anarchy? There can be but one answer to this question. For the present our soldiers must stay. Little by little native troops can be substituted for them.

And what as to the future government of the archipelago? Should the Filipinos be given a free hand from the start? Most certainly not. Very few of them really want it, and in any event the result of such experiments in government as have already been made is conclusive. They cannot yet walk alone. Shall we, then, leave

them to crawl? The academician may say "Yes," but the practical man will answer with an emphatic "No!"

How far can they be intrusted with the affairs of government? The only safe basis for a reply to this question is experience. Probably few people know how much has already been done toward solving the problem by actual experiment. The municipal and provincial governments which have been, and are being, set up will in due time furnish a safe foundation for congressional action. For the rest, I believe that the American people can be depended on to see that the Filipinos are allowed to share in their own government so fast and so far as they shall show themselves able and fit to do so. It is certain that we shall never make enemies by giving more, but we shall inevitably do so if we take away what we have once given. We should, therefore, begin carefully, increasing the rights and privileges of our wards as rapidly as safety will permit.

I have purposely refrained from saying anything as to the importance of the Philippines from a commercial standpoint. The opponents of our present policy seem peculiarly sensitive in regard to this matter. They feel themselves free to insist that the islands are nearly or quite worthless; that all commercial advantages which would result from their retention can be obtained in other ways, and that white men can not live there anyhow; and if one attempts to discuss these statements he is at once called a mercenary brute.

Now I believe that in considering any important question full consideration should be given to every argument for and against it, but I have too much consideration for my audience to begin the discussion of the present and prospective wealth of the Philippines at this late hour, and in any event I do not think it necessary to base an argument for their retention on such grounds.

I believe that the war we are waging to deliver the Filipino people from their Tagalog masters is just as truly a war in the interests of humanity as was the one which drove the Spaniards out of Cuba, but our work will only have begun when it is over. If we are to succeed in the task which we have undertaken, we must exercise the greatest care in the selection of our administrative officials. There will be much for them to learn, and those who show willingness and ability to learn it, and who demonstrate their worth, should be kept in office during good behavior. In short, we must adopt the same sound principles that would guide the sensible manager of any great business enterprise in the selection, the retention, and the promotion of his employees.

In closing, let me say that there does not live an "Anti-imperialist" who has a more sincere regard for the people of the Philippine Islands, or a keener interest in their welfare, than myself. I believe that under our guidance they will make rapid progress in civilization, and will eventually be able to take an important share in the government of their country, but I know that if the full weight of that burden were thrown upon them to-day they would inevitably sink under it.

Those who affect to believe that we are creating bloody disorder

by our presence in the Philippine Islands ; that the natives would continue to hate us, even if we gave them good government ; that they would be better off under a very bad government entirely their own than under a very good one administered in part by others, and that the only logical and honorable course open to us is to withdraw our forces, and leave the peaceable and law-abiding natives at the mercy of Emilio Aguinaldo and his army, may be sincere in their convictions, but by freely giving voice to them they are encouraging the ambitious Tagalog leader to prolong a struggle which, even if successful, would only bring years full of trouble and disorder to his people. The prolongation of this struggle is costing us millions of dollars, and what is far worse, good, red, American blood. History will fix the responsibility for it.

Those of us who believe that the flag should stay in the East, and that under its shadow we should patiently teach to our new wards the lessons they must learn ere they can hope to take their place in the great family of nations a free and united people, should let the world know where we stand, and we should stand shoulder to shoulder. Let those scoff who will. There is work for us to do. The future of ten millions of human beings, no less than the honor of a great nation, are in our keeping. The eyes of the world are upon us.

“ Take up the White Man’s burden—

Ye dare not stoop to less—

Nor call too loud on freedom

To cloke your weariness.

By all ye will or whisper,

By all ye leave or do,

The silent sullen peoples

Shall weigh your God and you.

“ Take up the White Man’s burden!

Have done with childish days—

The lightly-proffered laurel,

The easy ungrudged praise :

Comes now, to search your manhood

Through all the thankless years,


Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,

The judgment of your peers.”

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